On Pax Silica: Our Interest Should Be Our Interest

July 27, 2026

1. We only know the broad idea. The United States wants to build a supply chain for artificial intelligence and semiconductors, covering everything from critical minerals and electricity to advanced manufacturing, computing infrastructure and AI models. In joining Pax Silica, the Philippines intends to use a 1,600-hectare industrial hub in New Clark City to process minerals, manufacture high-technology components and accommodate major AI infrastructure.

2. We’ve heard the promised benefits: investment, jobs, new industries, technology transfer, increased tax revenues, and an opportunity for the Philippines to move beyond exporting raw minerals and assembling low-value components. If properly designed, Pax Silica — supporters say — will help us claim a valuable place in industries that will shape the world economy for decades.

Those are not trivial benefits. The Philippines has spent years talking about industrialization while repeatedly missing opportunities to build the infrastructure, skills and industries required to achieve it.

3. Still, we should not accept Pax Silica blindly merely because government officials and foreign investors describe it as transformative. There are counterarguments that are equally, if not more, convincing.

For one, the government says the project will not endanger local water supplies because it will rely on rainwater, dams or impounding facilities. Environmental groups respond that facilities associated with AI and semiconductor manufacturing will consume extraordinary quantities of water, and verbal assurances are no substitute for scientific data — data that has not yet been provided.

Then, the government says Pax Silica will not burden the electricity grid because the project will develop its own power sources. Again, that is an assertion, not necessarily a fact. The only thing that all sides can agree on — or at least no one denies — is that it will represent an enormous addition to the country’s power system.

Building separate generation facilities does not automatically resolve the issue. What kind of power plants will be constructed and will they be enough? Will its power contracts affect electricity prices elsewhere? What happens during shortages, droughts or periods when these facilities fail?

“Generating its own electricity” sounds reassuring, but those are just words that haven’t been backed by actual plans that experts can independently validate.

4. The same uncertainty surrounds the nature of the hub itself. Some say it will mostly have AI data centers, while others say that the main activity will be manufacturing components rather than operating data centers.

This is not a minor distinction. A semiconductor assembly plant, a mineral-processing facility, a chip fabrication plant and a hyperscale AI data center have very different requirements, environmental footprints, employment profiles and economic benefits.

5. Nor is there a clear picture of the communities that will be affected. Environmental and community groups claim that Aeta communities and farmers may face displacement or disruption. BCDA says the land belongs to the government, that no ancestral-domain title covers the site, and that only a small number of farmers will be directly affected.

But whether people possess a formal title is not the same question as whether their homes, livelihoods, water sources or traditional use of the land will be affected. These questions should be answered through baseline studies and open public consultations that are conducted before the important decisions become irreversible.

I have not seen evidence of a consultation process proportionate to the scale of what is being proposed. Where are the development plans, the independent cost-benefit analysis, the water studies, the power studies, the fiscal incentives, the environmental baselines, and the legal framework that will govern the zone? And have they been vetted by independent experts?

6. This does not prove that Pax Silica is harmful. But it does prove — at least to me — that no one yet has enough information to decide whether its benefits outweigh its costs.

That should be the starting point of any honest discussion, and the onus of making the case should lie with the government.

Before commitments are finalized, the government should commission credible environmental and economic assessments, not studies produced solely by the project’s proponents. These should be open to public scrutiny, along with any and all agreements, proposed incentives, land arrangements, and other relevant information.

And, again, the communities surrounding New Clark City should be genuinely consulted while they can still influence the project — not after the essential terms have already been settled.

Simply put, we do not know enough to form a position on Pax Silica, so we should not be rushed into making a decision.

7. Then, there are the two questions hardly anyone is asking: Whose AI strategy are we joining? And is it in our interest to do so?

Pax Silica is not merely an investment program. This is obviously a play by the United States to forestall the rise of China as an AI power. While most of what I’ve read say the US is still in the lead, the impression is that this lead is tenuous, and that China is on the rise not only in AI, but also in other technologies of the future, particularly renewables.

Is it in our interest to cast our lot with the US, and will joining Pax Silica still keep our options open with regard to similar projects or collaborations with China?

The United States may have the most advanced chips and many of the strongest AI companies. But China possesses scale, manufacturing capability, abundant energy infrastructure, critical-mineral processing — and momentum.

8. The relevant question then is not whether the United States or China is the more sympathetic power. The question is what arrangement best advances Philippine development, sovereignty and long-term technological capacity.

Joining Pax Silica may give us access to American investment, advanced semiconductor technology, higher-value markets and a trusted supply chain that many Western companies may prefer.

If so, those would be enormous advantages. But at what cost?

Will membership require us to exclude Chinese investors from particular industries? Will we be expected to adopt American export controls, investment-screening rules or procurement restrictions? Will Filipino companies be prevented from using Chinese AI models, telecommunications systems, batteries, solar equipment or industrial technology? Will critical minerals extracted in the Philippines be effectively reserved for a US-led supply chain?

Will the arrangement limit future partnerships before we even know what China may offer?

We must therefore distinguish between joining Pax Silica and surrendering our freedom to cooperate elsewhere.

9. Of course, “playing both sides” is easier said than done. We should not imagine that the Philippines can endlessly collect benefits from both powers without making difficult choices. We should expect the United States to condition access to its most advanced technology on tighter alignment. On the other hand, China can be expected to retaliate economically or offer better terms to countries that reject American restrictions.

We should be clear and transparent — both to ourselves and to the other parties — about our interests in negotiations.

We are not exactly without leverage.

The Philippines possesses things both sides want: a strategic location, mineral resources, a large, young and skilled English-speaking workforce, and political influence within Southeast Asia. We should not give them away simply in exchange for an uncertain promise of investment and technology transfer.

10. We should expect both sides to compete — not merely over how much money they will invest, but over who will provide greater technology transfer, more jobs for Filipino engineers and managers, stronger environmental protections, better infrastructure, more local processing, fairer revenue-sharing, and fewer restrictions on our present and future choices.

We should work with the United States where American cooperation advances Philippine interests. We should work with China where Chinese cooperation advances Philippine interests.

The question before us is not whether America or China should win this competition.

The question is whether the Philippines can emerge from it stronger than before.

We should welcome investment from any country prepared to advance Philippine interests. We should reject any arrangement that asks us to sacrifice our long-term options for short-term gains.

Our interest should be our interest.